Lessons from Ukraine and Beyond

Recent defence thinking increasingly recognises that survivability in modern conflict depends upon distributing capability across multiple layers rather than concentrating it within a limited number of high-value systems. Discussions at recent defence and industry forums, including those focused on the Defence Industrial Partnership and lessons emerging from contemporary conflict, have reinforced the view that command-and-control systems are now vulnerable to simultaneous cyber, electromagnetic and kinetic attack.

A growing body of operational evidence suggests that communications degradation is often caused as much by physical destruction of infrastructure and command nodes as by electronic attack. Long-range precision fires, loitering munitions and UAS-enabled targeting have demonstrated a persistent ability to locate and destroy headquarters, relay nodes and communications infrastructure. The communications challenge is therefore broader than spectrum protection alone.

The 20:40:40 approach reflects the need to balance exquisite capabilities with scalable and rapidly replaceable systems. Within such a construct, resilient networking, transport diversity and communications survivability become critical enablers, ensuring command-andcontrol continues even when individual nodes are degraded or destroyed.

Capabilities such as Intellian, Peplink, TAK and Somewear align well with this philosophy because they contribute to the distributed and resilient communications layer that enables forces to maintain operational effectiveness under pressure.

Through partnerships with leading technology providers, Network Innovations helps defence organisations integrate best-of-breed capabilities into resilient, mission-focused architecture saligned to operational needs.

A critical lesson emerging from both Ukraine and recent Middle Eastern operations is that command-and-control is now threatened simultaneously across multiple domains. Communications networks may be disrupted through cyber-attack, electronic warfare, physical destruction of infrastructure or precision strike against headquarters and relay nodes.

Kinetic attack against C2 infrastructure has become increasingly common. Adversaries routinely combine intelligence collection, UAV reconnaissance and spectrum monitoring to identify command posts before prosecuting them with long-range fires or loitering munitions. Communications survivability therefore depends not only on protecting data and spectrum access, but also on distributing command-and-control functions across multiple locations and multiple communications pathways.

The solution is architectural resilience. If one headquarters, bearer or communications route is lost, alternative pathways must already exist.

If Ukraine has demonstrated one transformational lesson, it is that the electromagnetic spectrum has become a manoeuvre space in its own right. The ability to communicate remains important. The ability to understand who else is communicating may be even more important.

An EW capability capable of scanning, replicating and denying signals across the 0–6 GHz spectrum provides a critical enhancement to operational awareness. Such systems enable forces not only to detect and identify emitters but also to understand activity within the spectrum and, where required, influence or disrupt adversary use of that spectrum.

This changes the role of communications architectures. The objective is no longer simply communications protection, but battlespace advantage through superior understanding of the electromagnetic environment.

Recent conflicts have demonstrated that electromagnetic activities rarely occur in isolation. Electronic warfare effects are increasingly coordinated with cyber operations, intelligence collection and kinetic strike. Adversaries routinely seek to identify command posts through their electromagnetic signatures before employing long-range fires or unmanned systems against them. Consequently, understanding the spectrum is no longer solely a technical activity. It has become a critical component of force protection, manoeuvre and targeting.

The integration of EW outputs into systems such as TAK offers promise, enabling pectrum information to become part of the commander's common operating picture.

The central lesson from Ukraine, the Middle East and wider observations from the Indo-Pacific operating environment is not that militaries require more communications equipment. Rather, they require communications architectures designed to survive the simultaneous effects of cyber-attack, electronic warfare, information operations and kinetic strike. Future advantage will increasingly belong to organisations capable of rapidly integrating diverse technologies into resilient, distributed and adaptive command-and-control networks.

The capabilities discussed within this report are not developmental concepts. They represent mature, operationally proven technologies already employed by military, government and security organisations across NATO, Five Eyes and partner nations. Their relevance extends beyond a single theatre, having demonstrated utility in environments ranging from the High North and Northern Europe to the Middle East, Indo-Pacific and expeditionary operations worldwide. This operational pedigree significantly reduces integration risk whilst accelerating delivery of capability aligned to the MOD's Digital Backbone and Multi-Domain Integration ambitions.

None of these capabilities represents a complete solution in isolation. Together, however, they provide the foundations of a modern communications architecture aligned with the realities of contemporary warfare and the future direction of UK defence.

The key question for MOD is therefore not whether these individual technologies work. The evidence suggests they do. The more important question is whether MOD can rapidly integrate commercially mature capabilities such as these into a coherent operational architecture before future conflicts demand it.

Success will depend not only on technology selection, but on the ability to integrate capabilities into resilient architectures aligned to operational requirements, an area in which technology integrators such as Network